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SOFTENING THE ERISA BLOW: MINIMIZ-
ING PHYSICIAN LIABILITY FOR PATIENT
INJURIES CAUSED BY MANAGED CARE
ORGANIZATION COST CONTAINMENT
MEASURES
I. NrRoDUcTION
Lisa Young goes to the hospital because she fears she is in premature labor at
only 25 weeks gestation. In her previous pregnancy she had premature labor that
required hospitalization and medication. Lisa's physician examines her, and
although Lisa's symptoms do not seem serious, the doctor knows from past
experience that she needs to keep Lisa in the hospital for a minimum of three or
four days for observation. If her labor progresses quickly like it did the previous
time, Lisa's doctor wants to be able to immediately give Lisa intravenous
medication to stop the labor. A nurse employed by the managed care organization'
that covers Lisa Young performs a utilization review (UR) - to make sure the three
or four day inpatient stay requested by the doctor is really necessary. The nurse
thinks it is not and only authorizes an overnight stay for observation.
Lisa's condition does not change the next morning, so Lisa is discharged from
the hospital. Even though her doctor thinks she should stay longer, Lisa goes home
because she is poor and cannot afford to pay for her care. Her husband drives her
home, which is an hour from the hospital.
The following evening, Lisa starts to feel pain in her pelvic area. She wonders
if it is the Mexican food her husband brought home. She decides to see how she
feels in the morning. By 3:00 a.m., her pain is so intense that she knows something
is terribly wrong. Her husband drives her back to the hospital. By the time she gets
to the hospital, she is irrevocably in the process of labor. Her baby is born shortly
after her arrival. Because the baby is so premature, he will require several months
of hospital care. As a result of the premature birth, Lisa's baby develops cerebral
palsy He will require many thousands of dollars of care throughout his life, and
1. See Your Guide to Managed Care, infra note 5 (explaining that any entity that utilizes cost containment
measures to save money in a health care delivery system is a managed care organization (MCO)). See also 42
U.S.C. § 1396b (m)(1)(a), which also defines "medicaid managed care organization."
2. See Mark K. Wedel, California's Legal Implications for Utilization Review as a Health Care Cost
Containment Measure, 1 SAN Dimo JUSTIcE J. 415, 415-16 (1993) (explaining that utilization review (UR) is a
method of cost control that evaluates the appropriateness, necessity, and quality of health services being rendered.
If the proposed treatment is deemed not to be appropriate or necessary, payment for the treatment may be denied.).
679
1
Redman: Softening the ERISA Blow: Minimizing Physician Liability for Pati
Published by TU Law Digital Commons, 1999
TULSA LAW JOURNAL
will always have major medical problems. If she had been in the hospital for three
days, as requested by her doctor, it is probable that her premature labor could have
been quickly detected and thus, prevented.
The woman's health coverage is provided through her employer. Because of
this, her managed care organization is probably immune from lawsuits under
ERISA.4 Lisa Young is left without a remedy unless she sues her doctor.
With the cost of health care skyrocketing in America today, there must be
measures taken to keep costs down, yet the cost containment measures used by
managed care organizations are certain to cause patient injuries. This comment will
explore how liability of third party payors5 for injuries to patients caused by cost
containment measures affects physicians.
The law needs to change so that injured patients have greater remedies against
managed care organizations. This comment will not address in detail the need for
legislation; rather, it will examine the problem and suggest ways that lawyers with
physician clients can work within the imperfect system, by initially suggesting ways
that managed care organizations can be held liable for their actions. In addition,
this comment outlines steps physicians can take to minimize their liability. First,
this comment will provide background information on managed care and cost
containment measures, concentrating primarily on utilization review. Second, it
will examine the status of the law concerning physician liability when cost
containment measures injure a patient. This section will focus on two cases that
illustrate how patients can suffer when managed care organizations employ
utilization review to keep costs down, and how physicians are in danger of being
held liable for these injuries. It will then show how this problem is further
aggravated by ERISA, which is a federal law that gives managed care organizations
substantial immunity. Section four will analyze ways that this immunity can be
limited or circumscribed including construing ERISA narrowly, using the theories
of vicarious and enterprise liability to hold managed care organizations responsible,
and labeling utilization review decisions as medical decisions instead of benefit
determinations. Section five explains how to minimize physician liability, first by
examining what a physician's duty should be in the era of managed care. Finally,
this Comment proposes practical strategies physicians can use to limit their liability
even if the ERISA preemption cannot be narrowed.
3. Cerebral Palsyis a term used to describe a disease resulting from prenatal developmental disorders or central
nervous system damage which occurs at or shortly around birth. This disease is characterized by impaired
voluntary movement. Prematurity, birth trauma, and neonatal asphyxia are factors leading to the disease. Cerebral
Palsy is a "lifelong condition". Seizures are common. Physical therapy, occupational therapy, limb braces,
orthopedic surgery, and speech therapy are often required. Children with the disease will need lifelong supervision,
and will never achieve social independence. ROBERT BERKow, M.D., THE MERCK MANUAL OF DIAGNOSIS AND
THERAPY 2263-64 (16th ed. 1992).
4. See Jim M. Perdue & Stephen R. Baxley, Cutting Costs - Cutting Care: Can Texas Managed Health Care
Systems and HMOs be Liable for the Medical Malpractice of Physicians?, 27 ST. MARY'S L J. 23,59-60 (1995)
(explaining that ERISA is the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, a federal law that preemts any
state law or cause of action if the cause of action relates to a covered benefit plan). These benefit plans cover many
MCOs. The result is that many otherwise strong claims against MCOs by patients are barred from recovery.
5. See Your Guide to Managed Care, IDAHO STATESMAN, Sept. 8, 1997, at 5a (defining third party payors as
any payor of health care services, other than the patient. It can be any type of MCO, even the federal government).
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II. BACKGROUND
A. How Health Care is Paid for in America Today
The last decade has seen tremendous changes in the way health care is
delivered.6 Today's health care system is comprised of third-party payors who
"influence medical decisions through their implementation of cost containment
measures."7 It is beyond dispute that health care finance is a growing problem
today. Advances in every area of medicine have created huge progress in
diagnosing, treating, and preventing disease, yet the monetary cost has been high.
Health care costs are growing faster than the rate of inflation.8 In addition, health
care expenditures in the United States are consuming a growing percentage of the
Gross National Product (GNP).9 If health care expenditures grow at the same rate
they are growing currently, health care costs will be close to a third of America's
GNP by the year 2030.0 Managed care organizations and their cost containment
measures are an answer to this health care cost problem.
Any entity that utilizes cost containment measures in a health care delivery
system can be categorized as a managed care organization (MCO). n MCOs can
also be defined as "organizations that employ or contract with physicians to deliver
care to defined groups of individuals as an alternative to private fee-for-service
medicine." 2 The goal of an MCO is to reduce the cost of health care while
maximizing patient well being and treatment.13 Currently, many people are insured
by MCOs. t4 It is estimated that by the year 2000, at least 80% of Americans will
receive medical care through MCOs. " Government funded healthcare is also within
the scope of managed care.16 Many Medicare and Medicaid beneficiaries are
enrolled in MCOs.17 Managed care is almost certain to affect physicians, since
more than 75% of physicians practice medicine in some type of MCO.18 MCOs
6. See Barbara A. Noah, The Managed Care Dilemma: Can Theories ofTort Liability Adapt to the Realities
of Cost Containment?, 48 MERCER L. REv. 1219 (1997).
7. SuzanneM. Grosso, RethinkingMalpracticeLiabilityandERISA Preemption in theAge ofManaged Care,
9 STANFORD L &PoL'Y Rnv.433,434(1998). See also Your Guide to Managed Care, IDAHO STATESMAN, Sept.
8, 1997, at 5a (defining third party payors as any payer of health care services, other than the patient. It can be any
type of MCO, even the federal government).
8. See Grosso, supra note 7, at 434.
9. See Jonathan J. Frankel, Medical Malpractice Law and Health Care Cost Containment: Lessons for
Reformers from the Clash of Cultures, 103 YALE LJ. 1297 (1994).
10. See id. (citing Victor R. Fuchs, No Pain, No Gain, 269 JAMA 631,631 (1993)).
11. See Grosso, supra note 7, at 435.
12. Edward P. Richards & Thomas R. McLean, Physicians in Managed Care: A MultidimensionalAnalysis
of New Trends in Liability and Business Risk, 18 J. OF LEGAL MED. 443, 446 (1997).
13. See id.
14. See Noah, supra note 6, at 12.
15. See id., at 1220. See also Private Sector Advocacy and Support Team, Am. Med. Ass'n, Managed Care
and the Market: A Summary of National Trends Affecting Physicians 2 (1995).
16. See KENNm R. WNG ET AL, THE LAW AND AMERICAN HEALTH CARE 70 (1988).
17. See id.
18. See Noah, supra note 6, at 1219.
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claim that the quality of care will not suffer as a result of cost savings because of
the reviews of medical appropriateness and cost-effectiveness they make. 9 This
author feels that though reducing cost is important, cost containment measures by
their very nature must result in patients being injured because they are denied
treatment that they need. These cost containment measures are also burdensome for
physicians because they interfere with the fundamental physician-patient
relationship.
B. Cost Containment Methods
There are several methods utilized by MCOs to keep costs down. These
include pre-authorization of hospitalizations and hospital stays, second opinion
requirements, length-of-stay restrictions, and utilization review.2" MCOs also keep
costs down by paying providers less and discouraging physicians from overusing
medical testing and referrals to specialists.21
Utilization review (UR) is especially burdensome for physicians, as it is the
most widely used mechanism to keep costs down in most MCOs.22 Utilization
review is a threat to physician autonomy, because it puts another entity in the
middle of the doctor/patient relationship.' The purpose of utilization review is to
influence treatment decisions, so it must influence or possibly even overrule the
physician's treatment plan.24
1. The Role of Utilization Review Boards in Today's Health Care Delivery
Utilization review can be defined as "[a] cost-control mechanism by which the
appropriateness, necessity and quality of health-care services are monitored...."'
There are two types of utilization review, retrospective and prospective. Retrospec-
tive UR looks at what was done after the fact to evaluate the appropriateness of
medical care.26 Prospective (also called concurrent) UR takes place during the
patient's treatment.27 The potential liability is much greater in prospective
28
utilization review.The utilization review business is a billion dollar industry.29 Some third party
19. See id.
20. See Grosso, supra note 7, at 434.
21. See Richards, supra note 12, at 449.
22. See Wedel, supra note 2, at 414.
23. See Grosso, supra note 7, at 435.
24. See Grosso, supra note 7, at 435. See also Griner, infra note 26, at 884; Noah, supra note 6, at 1249;
Furrow, The Ethics of Cost Containment: Bureaucratic Medicine and the Doctor as Patient Advocate, 3 NOTRE
DAME J. L ETmcs & PUB. POL'Y 187 (1988).
25. Your Guide to Managed Care, supra note 5.
26. See David D. Griner, Paying the Piper: Third-Party Payor Liabilityfor Medical Treatment Decisions, 25
GA. L REV. 861 at 884-85 (1991).
27. See id.
28. See id. at 885.
29. See Paul J. Kenkel, Review Firms Under Review, MODERN HEALTHCARE, Sept. 10, 1990, at 98.
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payors do their own utilization review, while many others hire outside firms.30
Businesses that perform this service are often paid according to how much money
they save MCOs by reducing or denying medical claims.31 There are hundreds of
firms that provide these review services.32 In fact, one woman who works in
utilization review says that each person working in utilization review must "prove
her worth by submitting statistics on how much money she's saved. ... "'
It is interesting to study who is conducting utilization reviews. A House
Select Committee on Aging study shows that "everyone from physicians to records
technicians are conducting reviews."34 Nurses make up the bulk of utilization
reviewers35, along with medical records staff.36 One staff member explains that she
reviews up to sixty charts per day, only spending an average of seven to fifteen
minutes on each one.37 Some people familiar with the system of utilization review
suggest that only physicians in the relevant specialty should have the final say in
denial of patient benefits.3"
Because of the potential for abuse, many states are beginning to regulate
utilization review companies.39 The American Medical Association is very active
in the area of pushing for utilization review reform4 They suggest development
of stringent licensing standards, publication of utilization review criteria, and
prohibitions against compensating reviewers based on money they save by denying
treatment.4 '
II. PHYSICIAN LIABim: THE STATUS OF THE LAW
A. Cases
The following two cases illustrate how cost containment measures can result
in tragic patient injuries. They also show that it is possible for the patient's
physician to be held liable for the resulting injury.
30. See Grosso, supra note 7, at 435.
31. See Kenkel, supra note 29, at 98.
32. See id.
33. Donna Zoldi, What's it Like in Utilization Reviev? QualityAssurance and Utilization Review Specialists,
RN, Feb. 1992, at 41.
34. Dan Wise, Utilization Review: Is it Cost Effective?, HEALTH LINE, Jan. 21, 1993.
35. See Zoldi, supra note 33, at 41 (estimating that about 80% of utilization review staffers are nurses). See
generally Wise, supra note 34.
36. See Dan Rode, Is it Time to Combine Utilization Review and Admitting? Patient Care Policies of
Hospitals, HEALTHCAREFINANCtALMANAGEMENT, Oct. 1992, at77. See also Zoldi, supra note 33, at41; See also
Wickline v. Wilson, 192 Cal. App. 3d 1630 (1986), holding limited by Wilson v. Blue Cross of Southern Ca., 222
Cal. App. 3d 660 (1990).
37. See Zoldi, supra note 33, at 41.
38. See Noah, supra note 6, at 1260.
39. See Kenkel, supra note 29, at 98.
40. See Mary R. Kohler, When the Whole Exceeds the Sum of its Parts: Why Existing Utilization Management
Practices Don't Measure Up, 53 U. PrIT. L. REV. 1061,1080 (1992).
41. See id.
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1. Wickline v. State of California42
Wickline v. State of California3 is a case that deals with the legal responsibil-
ity of third party payors for injuries caused to a patient because of the third party
payor's cost containment measures.' Although the plaintiff-patient only brought
suit against the third party payor, this case is also important to physicians because
the court seems to place a large burden on the physician.
a. Facts of the Wickline Case45
Wickline, a woman in her mid-40s, was being treated for back and leg pain by
her family practice physician, Dr. Daniels. 46 After several methods of treatment
failed, Dr. Daniels admitted Wickline to Van Nuys Community Hospital. Dr.
Polonsky, a peripheral vascular surgeon,47 examined Wickline and diagnosed her
with Leriche's syndrome.' Dr. Polonsky determined that Wickline's disease was
so far advanced that it was necessary to replace a portion of her artery with a Teflon
graft". Wickline was eligible for medical benefits under Medi-Cal, California's
medical assistance program for the poor." Medi-Cal authorized the surgery and
ten days of hospitalization.51 Wickline was admitted to Van Nuys Community
Hospital by Dr. Daniel on January 6, 1977, and the next day Dr. Polonsky
performed the surgery, replacing part of Wickline's aorta with the Teflon graft.52
He described her operation as "very major surgery."53  Wickline developed
circulatory problems later in the day, so Dr. Polonsky took Wickline back to surgery
to remove a clot in the Teflon graft.54 Dr. Polonsky was assisted by Dr. Kovner,
chief of surgery at Van Nuys, during all of Wickline's surgeries.55 Wickline's
recovery following the two surgeries was categorized as "stormy. 5
6
Wickline was scheduled to be discharged on January 16, just four days after
42. 192 Cal. App. 3d at 1630.
43. See id.
44. See id.
45. See id. at 1632-42 (presenting facts of the case).
46. See iL at 1634. The Court noted that Lois Wickline was a woman of limited education.
47. See id. at 1634. Peripheral vascular surgery is surgery on any vessel of the body except the heart.
48. Wickline, 192 Cal. App. 3d at 1634. Leriche's Syndrome is where there is blockage of the abdominal aorta.
The aorta is the main artery of the body, which carries blood from the heart to all of the organs of the body.
49. See id at 1635.
50. See id
51. See id.
52. See id.
53. Id.
54. See Wickline, 192 Cal. App. 3d at 1635.
55. See id. at 1636.
56. Id. at 1635. Wickline had a great deal of pain, spasms, and hallucinations. As a result, she received a
lumbar sympathectomy on January 12. A lumbar sympathectomyis a major operation in which nerves are removed
from either side of the spinal column in an attempt to stop the spasms. This was necessary to prevent clots from
forming when the spasms kept blood from moving freely through the graft.
[Vol. 35:679
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her most recent surgery. 57 Dr. Polonsky decided that it was "medically necessary 58
for Wickline to stay in the hospital an additional eight days past her original
discharge date of January 16." Drs. Daniels and Kovner agreed with Polonsky6
Dr. Polonsky cited danger of infection and/or clotting as the reason for keeping
Wickline longer.6" He wanted to keep Wickline in the hospital to observe her and
be instantly available to treat an emergency so that he could save both of Wickline' s
legs.
62
Dr. Polonsky requested that a nurse fill out a Medi-Cal form requesting an
extension of Wickline's hospital stay.63 Dr. Daniels signed the form and all three
doctors testified that the form was filled out properly.'
The nurse responsible for the utilization review of Wickline's form felt she
could not approve eight days of hospitalization, so she phoned the Medi-Cal
consultant physician on duty, Dr. Glassman, aboard certified general surgeon.65 Dr.
Glassman rejected the eight day extension, instead granting only four days.66 He
assumed Wickline was progressing satisfactorily and "was not seriously or critically
ill."'67 Dr. Glassman never consulted with a peripheral vascular surgeon6" even
though Medi-Cal made them available to their consultants.69 Dr. Glassman based
his decision primarily on Wickline's apparently normal bowel function, tempera-
ture, and diet, which were irrelevant to Wickline' s primary condition.7" He ignored
symptoms a reasonably prudent physician would consider important to evaluate
Wickline's condition.71
Wickline was released from the hospital on January 21 after her four day
extension.72 All three of Wickline's physicians knew the request for an eight day
extension was denied, and were aware that they could call Dr. Glassman (the Medi-
Cal consultant) to appeal his decision.73 None of the three physicians did so!4
Wickline's condition on the date of discharge had neither improved nor deteriorated
57. See id. at 1636.
58. Id.
59. See id.
60. See Wickline, 192 Cal. App. 3d at 1636.
61. See id.
62. See id.
63. See id.
64. See id. at 1637. The Medi-Cal form was "Request for Extension of Stay in Hospital", commonly called
"MC-180". The hospital must fill out the form with information provided by the physician. The form is then
submitted to Medi-Cal's representative for authorization. The nurse who reviewed the MC-180 had the authority
to approve the request without further authorization. She had to contact a Medi-Cal consultant physician if she
felt that the request should be rejected or modified. It was the consulting physician's duty to ultimately make the
decision.
65. See id.
66. See id.
67. Wickline, 192 Cal. App. 3d at 1638.
68. See id. at 1634 (explaining that peripheral vascular surgery is surgery on any vessel of the body except the
heart).
69. See id. at 1639.
70. See id.
71. See Wickline, 192 Cal. App. 3d at 1639.
72. See id.
73. See id.
74. See id.
20001
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since the date of the request for extension. Dr. Polonsky noted on Wickline's
discharge summary that it did not appear that her leg was in any danger.76
At trial, Dr. Polonsky testified that he felt that the Medi-Cal consultant placed
the State's interests above the welfare of the patient, that Medi-Cal had the power
to tell him when the patient must be discharged, and these factors resulted in his
decision not to appeal Medi-Cal's denial of Wickline's eight day hospital
extension.77 However, Dr. Polonsky did note that he would have made an effort to
keep Wickline in the hospital if he thought her condition was deteriorating.78 All
medical experts at trial testified that Dr. Polonsky met the standard of care in the
medical community when he discharged Wickline. 9
Dr. Kovner spoke to Wickline's husband prior to her discharge and explained
to him how to care for Wickline at home. 0 On the first and second day after
Wickline's discharge from the hospital, she began to feel pain in her leg and the leg
began to lose color and look like marble." Wickline did not call any of her
physicians because she assumed this was a normal part of recovery.82 By the third
day her leg started to turn gray and the pain increased. 3 She testified that she called
one of her doctors who prescribed her pain medicationJ' 4 During the next few days,
Wickline's leg turned blue and the pain became excruciating." Wickline's husband
phoned Dr. Kovner, who ordered her back to the hospital.8 6 Dr. Polonsky examined
Wickline and determined she had an infection in the graft site that caused clotting
in her leg. As a result, she had no circulation in her leg.87 Attempts to save
Wickline's leg through non-surgical methods proved impossible.88 Dr. Polonsky
amputated Wickline's leg below the knee in order to save her life.89 This was not
enough to improve Wickline's condition, so she was taken back to surgery where
doctors amputated her leg above the knee.'
In Dr. Polonsky's opinion, had Wickline been in the hospital for the entire
eight days he requested, her leg could have been saved." He would have noticed
the changes in Wickline's leg immediately and performed surgery to remove the
75. See id.
76. See id.
77. See Wickline, 192 Cal. App. 3d at 1640.
78. See id.
79. See i&. It is important to note that Lois Wickline protested her discharge from the hospital
80. See id. The care Dr. Kovner suggested to Mr. Wickline consisted of topical antibiotic powder, medicine,
warm baths, and rest.
81. See id.
82. See id.
83. See Wickline, 192 Cal. App. 3d at 1640.
84. See id.
85. See id. at 1641.
86. See id. The date was January 30, nine days after discharge.
87. See id.
88. See id Dr. Polonsky was not able to remove the clot because the infection would have spread through
Wickline's body creating more clots or blood poisoning, both can cause death. The use of anti-dotting
medications, antibiotics, strict bed rest, pain medicine, and whirlpool baths were not successful.
89. See Wickline, 192 Cal. App. 3d at 1641.
90. See id.
91. See id at 1641-42.
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clot, exactly as he had done in Wickline's second surgery.92 Her infection could
have been controlled with IV antibiotics.93 Dr. Polinsky also testified that the
rejection of the eight day extension did not conform to current medical standards.94
b. The Wickline Court's Analysis of the Case
The importance of Wickline is that it enunciated that third party payors can be
held liable when their actions cause negligence. The California Supreme Court
explicitly lays this out:
The patient who requires treatment and who is harmed when care which should
have been provided is not provided should recover for the injuries suffered from
all those responsible for the derivation of such care, including, when appropriate,
health care payors. Third party payors of health care services can be held legally
accountable when medically inappropriate decisions result from defects in the
design or implementation of cost-containment mechanism as, for example, when
appeals made on a patient's behalf for medical or hospital care are arbitrarily
ignored or unreasonably disregarded or overridden. 5
However, the court did not intend to allow the physician to abdicate any
responsibility for patient care to the insurance company:
[T]he physician who complies without protest with the limitations imposed by a
third party payor, when his medical judgment dictates otherwise, cannot avoid his
ultimate responsibility for his patient's care. He cannot point to the health care
payor as the liability scapegoat when the consequences of his own determinative
medical decisions go sour.96
The court explained even though Dr. Polonsky was intimidated by Medi-Cal,
he was not powerless to act if he felt it was in his patient's best interest to stay an
extra eight days instead of four.97 However, all three of Wickline's physicians
agreed that Dr. Polonsky's decision to discharge Wickline was within the standard
of care at the time.98 Because of this, the court held there could be no viable cause
of action against Medi-Cal. 9 The court did not address what Dr. Polonsky should
have done if the appeal was denied, however, though it is implied that Polonsky
92. See icL at 1642.
93. See id.
94. See id
95. Wickline, 192 Cal. App. 3d at 1645.
96. Id. at 1645 (emphasis added).
97. See id. at 1645-46.
98. See id. at 1646.
99. See iL
2000]
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should have left the patient in the hospital."'0
The court then examined the statutory and administrative rules that authorized
denial of Medi-Cal benefits.°1' It determined that California's legislative intent in
the creation of Medi-Cal was to provide medical care to the indigent "whenever
possible and feasible," and "to the extent possible."0 2 The court ultimately held
that "the Medi-Cal Consultant's decision, vis-a-vis the request to extend
Wickline's's hospital stay, was in accord with then existing statutory law."' 3
2. Wilson v. Blue Cross"°
The facts in Wilson are more to the point. Howard Wilson Jr. was admitted
to College Hospital in Los Angeles on March 1, 1983 for major depression, drug
addiction, and anorexia. 5 His physician felt that he needed to be treated in the
hospital for three to four weeks. 6 After eleven days Western Medical declared it
would not pay for anymore inpatient hospital care.0 7 Western Medical is the
company that provided review decisions for Wilson's insurance company, Blue
Cross.'0 8 Neither Wilson nor any of his family could afford to pay for any further
treatment, so Wilson was discharged."° He committed suicide on March 31. 0
The issue in the Wilson case is whether the conduct of Western Medical was
a substantial causal factor in his death.1 The representative of Wilson's estate
brought a wrongful death action against Western Medical and Blue Cross but not
Wilson's physician."2 The trial court granted Western Medical's motion for
summary judgment."3 However, the Court of Appeals in California found there
was substantial evidence that Western Medical's refusal to approve hospitalization
beyond ten days was a substantial factor in the death of Wilson."' Wilson's
treating physician said there was a reasonable medical probability that Wilson
would not have killed himself if he had stayed in the hospital for the full recom-
100. See Richards, supra notel2, at 454.
101. See Wickline, 192 Cal. App. 3d at 1646.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 1647.
104. Wilson v. Blue Cross of Southern California, 222 Cal. App. 3d 660 (1990).
105. See id. at 669.
106. See id.
107. See id.
108. See id. at 667.
109. See id.
110. See Wilson, 222 Cal. App. 3d at 663-64.
111. Id. at 664. See also williamA. Helvison, California's Wickline Decision Revisited, PHYsiciANExEct nw,
Nov. 1990, at 40 (explaining that the utilization review company for the insurer refused to certify the
hospitalization beyond 10 days).
112. See Wilson, 222 Cal. App. 3d at 667.
113. See id. at672.
114. Seeid. Note that Western Medical is the name of the utilization review company hired by Wilson's Insurer.
They used the concurrent utilization review process without knowing whether Wilson's Insurance Policy through
Blue Cross allowed for review. In addition, Western Medical was not aware that Wilson's policy allowed a
patient's treating physician to decided how long to keep a patient in the hospital as long as inpatient care did not
exceed 30 days.
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mended period of three to four weeks.11 5
Western Medical adopted Wickline's argument that physicians should be liable
for failure to appeal, so they (Western Medical) should not be liable.ll6 The court's
response significantly narrows Wickline. The Wilson court stated that the
discussion in Wickline about a physician's duty was merely dicta and had no
bearing on the Wilson case. 7 The failure of Wilson's physician to appeal Western
Medical's decision did not warrant the trial court's grant of summary judgment in
favor of the defendants."8
In reviewing the Wickline decision, the Wilson court pointed out that
statements concerning the physician's duty to appeal MCO decisions were "broadly
stated '" 9 and "unnecessary to the decision." ' Most importantly, the Wilson court
acknowledges the unfairness of providers being solely responsible for injuries
resulting from an MCO's cost containment measures.1
2
'
B. Managed Care Immunity under ERISA
Another significant factor affecting patients' rights and physicians' liability
in the age of managed care is the Employee Retirement Income Security Act
(ERISA). t2 - ERISA is a federal statute that contains a broad preemption clause
covering all state laws that "relate to" any employer-sponsored health care benefit
plans, even those managed by an MCO.1'2  ERISA is one of the broadest preemp-
tions in federal law. 24 ERISA is the governing law when state law differs from
ERISA.22 A large majority of MCOs are protected under ERISA.1 26 In fact, these
federally regulated plans account for a majority of private insurance. 27 Approxi-
mately 60 percent of people with health insurance today are covered by ERISA
plans. 28 The remedies available under ERISA are much more limited than those
available under state law. 2
9
One of the goals of ERISA is to encourage employers to provide health and
pension plans for employees. 30 Employers who did so would be rewarded by
115. See id. at 669-70.
116. See IVickline, 192 Cal. App. 3d at 1645.
117. See Wilson, 222 Cal. App. 3d at 673-74.
118. See id. at 674.
119. Peter Kazon, Court Narrows Landmark Liability Ruling; Third Party PayorLiablefor Premature Release
From the Hospital, MEDICAL ECONOMICS BUSINESS & HEALTH, Dec. 1990, at 58.
120. Id.
121. See Grosso, supra note 7, at 440.
122. 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 1001-1191 (West 1997).
123. Id.
124. See Wayne Blackmon, M.D., J.D., The Emerging Convergence of the Doctrine of Informed Consent and
Judicial Reinterpretation of the Employee Retirement Income Security Ac 19 J. OF LEGAL MEDICINE 377, 383.
125. See id. at 382.
126. See Noah, supra note 6, at 1243.
127. See Blackmon, supra note 124, at 381.
128. See Patients'Right to Sue HMO's Over Care Upheld in Texas, PHYSICLAN's FINANCIALNEws, Oct. 1998,
at 3.
129. See Allen D. Allred and Karen A. Carr, Enterprise Liability Puts MCOs at Risk, NAT'L L.J., Sept. 8, 1997,
at B9.
130. See generally Wing, supra note 16, at 765.
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enjoying limited liability. 131 It was also created to end appalling abuses of
employee pension plans by employers."' In these respects, it is a very useful law.
However, ERISA was passed a quarter of a century ago when it was impossible to
foresee how involved managed care would become.1 33 ERISA is out of date in
regard to health plans and has become "a shield for unacceptable behavior '13 even
though unacceptable behavior is what ERISA was created to prevent.
The problem with ERISA is that people who are injured through the negligent
actions of managed care organizations protected by ERISA have a very limited
legal remedy against the MCO, even when state law would otherwise provide a
remedy. 135 An ERISA plan enrollee that is injured as a result of cost containment
measures can only recover the cost of the treatment that was not offered. 136 This is
brought as a breach of contract instead of malpractice of the plan and is often a
negligible amount.'37 This is an egregious inequity.'38
There are other unfortunate consequences of ERISA as well. The statute does
not take into account the tremendous changes that have taken place in America's
health care system since ERISA's enactment in 1974, especially the power MCOs
have to affect patient care.'39 In addition, the law removes the incentive for ERISA
plans to provide high quality care. 140 The protection also provides an "unlevel
playing field' 41 in which ERISA protected MCOs are subject to far different
standards than non-ERISA MCOs.142 Finally, ERISA wastes judicial resources by
forcing courts to decide the scope of the preemption instead of concentrating on the
merits of the case. 3
IV. ANALYSIS OF ISSUES IMPORTANT TO THE TOPIC
A. Third Party Payor Responsibility for Physician Malpractice
Third party payors should be liable for malpractice if their intrusion into a
patient's treatment plan causes injury to the patient. This is important to physicians
131. See 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 1001-1191 (Xest 1997).
132. SeeA Crack in ERISA, AMERICAN MEDICALNEWS, Oct. 26, 1998, at 21.
133. See id.
134. Id.
135. See Prepared Testimony ofRuss Newman, Executive Director For Professional Practice on Behalf of The
American Psychological Association Before the House Education and Workforce Committee Subcommittee on
Employer-Employee Relations, FEDERALNEWS SERVICE, Oct. 23, 1997 [hereinafter Prepared Testimony of Russ
Newman].
136. See Prepared Statement of Thomas R. Reardon, M.D., Chair, American Medical Association's Board of
Trustees Before the Senate Labor and Human Resources Committee, FEDERALNEWVS SERVICE, March 24, 1998
[hereinafter statement of Thomas R. Reardon, M.D.].
137. See A Crack in ERISA, supra note 132, at 21.
138. See id.
139. See id.
140. See id.
141. Id.
142. See id.
143. See A Crack in ERISA, supra note 132, at 21.
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because when MCOs are immune from liability, the doctor is often the only entity
to sue, even when the doctor is not to blame.1" "The patient who is injured when
care which should have been provided is not provided will recover from someone
...the physician becomes the insurer." '45 It is important to patients that MCOs be
liable for their actions because institutions provide a more stable and dependable
source of relief.146 Physicians are more likely to utilize bankruptcy protection or not
carry malpractice insurance.147
There are several ways that courts can get around the ERISA preemption to
decide the merits of the patient's claim. First, courts can adopt a narrower
interpretation of the ERISA preemption. In addition, courts can use the theories of
vicarious and enterprise liability to narrow the scope of ERISA. Finally, courts can
hold plan administrators liable for MCO decisions, as well as hold that utilization
review is a medical decision.
1. Narrow Reading of ERISA
Courts are beginning to adopt a more narrow interpretation of the ERISA
preemption.' The United States Supreme Court, which has traditionally given
ERISA a very broad interpretation, is now beginning to narrow the statute's scope,
especially in the areas of tort law, health, and public safety. 49 The courts are
beginning to adopt an approach that is closer to ERISA's original purpose, which
is to protect employees and members, not corporations.15 The purpose of ERISA
was not to keep health care costs down; instead, Congress was trying to protect
pension plans. 51
A Texas state law'52 that went into effect in September 1997 was the first in
the country to allow patients to bring a malpractice suit against an MCO for the
health care quality decisions they make. 53 This law allows patients to sue MCOs
and collect damages if it can be proven that the MCO failed to provide quality
care. 54 The law was recently challenged for the first time by an MCO in Corporate
Health Insurance, Inc. v. Texas Department of Insurance.55 and upheld in part by
a U.S. District Judge.'56 The challenger argued that the law conflicts with ERISA,
144. See Arilcus Curiae Brief on Behalf of the California Medical Association in Support of Respondent Lois
J. Wiekline at 4-5, Wickline v. State, 228 Cal. Rptr. 661 (Ct. App. 1986) (No. B010156), noted in Frankel, supra
note 9, at 1317.
145. Id.
146. See Noah, supra note 6, at 1232.
147. See id,
148. See George Parker Young, Don't Pre-empt the HMO Liability Bill, TEXAS LAWYER, Sept. 22, 1997, at 26.
See also 514 U.S. 645 (1995) (making clear that ERISA should be subject to a narrow preemption interpretation)
149. See George Parker Young, Don't Pre-empt the HMO Liability Bill, TEXAS LAWYER, Sept. 22, 1997, at 26.
See also 514 U.S. 645 (1995) (making clear that ERISA should be subject to a narrow preemption interpretation)
150. See Young, supra note 149.
151. See iL
152. Senate Bill 386.
153. See Patients' Right to Sue Upheld supra note 128, at 3.
154. See Senate Bill 386, supra note 152.
155. 12 F.Supp.2d 597 (1998).
156. See Patients' Right to Sue Upheld, supra note 128, at 3.
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but the Judge in the case said that a lawsuit is not preempted by ERISA if it
challenges the quality of care received, which differs from a benefit
determination. 15 7 Thejudge said that further cases would be examined on a case-by-
case basis.1 58 Though this law represents a very important step in minimizing
ERISA, there is still much more to be done. First, this law upheld a patient's right
to sue an MCO for negligence, but this remedy is available only after harm has
occurred. It offers no injunctive relief.159 In addition, this represents only one
state's law. More than two dozen states have attempted to move forward with a law
similar to the Texas law and have failed. 6
An important proposed federal bill is the Patient Access to Responsible Care
Act (PARCA). 6' PARCA is sponsored by House and Senate Republicans and has
bipartisan support. 62 The motivation behind PARCA is to curtail the unfair results
of ERISA's preemption. 63 Drafters of PARCA take into account the fact that
ERISA was intended to deal with retrospectively denied payment, instead of
prospective denials of treatment which lead to patient injuries.)" PARCA's most
consequential provision takes away ERISA's broad preemption provision. 6 '
PARCA does not create a cause of action, rather it gives states the power to enact
legislation to create liability for MCOs that is not shielded by the ERISA
preemption.'66 PARCA also creates rules requirements for MCOs that protect
patients and ensure quality care, such as prohibiting inducements to providers for
limiting treatment, and issuing guidelines for utilization review. 167 If PARCA is
enacted, it will provide the protection patients need and take the sole liability
burden of patient cost containment injuries away from physicians.
2. Vicarious Liability
Because MCOs either employ or contract with physicians, an injured patient
may attempt to hold the MCO vicariously liable for his or her injury. 6 MCOs can
be exposed to vicarious liability claims under the theories of respondeat superior
157. See id.
158. See id.
159. See id,
160. See A Crack in ERISA, supra note 132, at 21.
161. H.R. 1415, 105' Cong. (1997).
162. See Greg Otterson, Medical Malpracticefor Texas HMOs: The End of a "Charned Life?", 39 S. TEX. L.
REV. 799, 840 (1998).
163. See id.
164. See id. at 841.
165. See id.
166. See id. at 841.
167. See id. at 842-43.
168. See Sharon M. Glenn, Tort Liability of Integrated Health Care Delivery Systems: Beyond Enterprise
Liability, 29 WAKEFoREsrL. Ray. 305, 314 (1994). See also Raglin v. HMO Illinois, Inc. 595 N.E.2d 153, 156
(1992) (recognizing that a potential exists for MCOs to be liable for medical malpractice based on vicarious
liability on the basis of respondeat superior or ostensible agency); Wing, supra notel6, at 761 (recognizing that
since 1995, the Third, Sixth, Seventh and Tenth Circuits have ruled that the possibility exists that claims against
MCOs might not be preempted when brought under the theory of vicarious liability).
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and ostensible agency. t69
Respondeat superior may be used to hold an MCO liable for the negligence
of its physicians if they are employees of the MCO.17 ° The theory of respondeat
superior holds that an employer may be held liable for the negligence of its
employee as long as the employee was acting within the scope of employment. 71
This theory focuses on whether the MCO has control or direction over the
physician.
Ostensible agency t73 may be used if respondeat superior does not apply.
Ostensible agency (apparent authority) may be used to hold an MCO liable for a
patient's injury if the MCO's behavior makes it reasonably apparent that the
utilization reviewer is acting as an agent of the MCO 74 If the MCO "holds out or
represents that an independent contractor is an employee,' 175 it can be held liable
under this theory.176 The patient must detrimentally rely upon this assumption that
the physician is an employee.1 77 Courts generally rely on the type of marketing
materials used to determine whether the MCO held the physician out as its own.
1 78
MCOs have minimized their risk in this area, however, by having patients sign
notices saying that they (the patients) understand that the physicians are independ-
ent contractors. 1
79
Texas case law provides a good example of three elements that mustbe proven
in order to find MCOs liable under the theory of ostensible agency.8 First, the
patient must reasonably believe in the physician's authority.' Next, the MCO
must have taken some action or omission that furthered this belief.'82 Third, the
169. See Glenn, supra note 168, at 314-15.
170. See ]]a S. Rothschild et a., Recent Developments In Managed Care, 32 TORT & INS. LJ. 463 (1997).
171. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 219 (1957).
172. la S. Rothschild et al., Recent Developments In Managed Care, 32 TORT &INS. L.J. 463 (1997). See also
Schleier v. Kaiser Foundation Health Care Plan, 876 F.2d 174 (D.C. Cir. 1989); Pacificare of Oklahoma Inc. v.
Burrage, 59 F.3d 151 (10th Cir. 1995). But see, Chase v. Independent Practice Ass'n., Inc., 583 N.E.2d. 251
(1991) (holding that the independent practice agency which contracted with MCO to arrange for health services
for MCO members was not vicariously liable for alleged negligence of physician who provided services to MCO
member, where IPA did not employ physicians directly, but instead contracted with another IPA for it to provide
physicians because IPA did not have right to hire and fire individual physicians, nor to set their salaries, work
schedules, or terms of employment, and IPA did not control actual medical decisions made by physicians or IPA
which provided physicians).
173. Ostensible Agency is a concept of agency which focuses solely on appearances. When the principal's
actions create the impression that she has authority to act, there is ostensible agency. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
AGENCY § 219 (1957).
174. See PeterH. Minaly, Health Care Utilization Review: Potential Exposuresto Negligence Liability, 52 OHHO
ST. LJ. 1289, 1302(1991). See also REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY §§ 8, 27 app. (1958).
175. Rothschild, supra note 170 at 463.
176. See id.
177. See id.
178. See id. See also Boyd v. Albert Einstein Medical Center, 547 A.2d 1229, at 1235 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1988).
179. See Rothschild, supra note 170 (explaining steps MCOs can take to protect themselves from ostensible
authority claims).
180. See Perdue, supra note 4, at 33.
181. See generally Nicholson v. Memorial Hosp. Sys., 722 S.W. 2d. 746, 750 (Tex. App. 1986); Brownsville
Medical Ctr. v. Gracia, 704 S.W. 2d. 68, 74 (Tex. App. 1985); Boyd v. Albert Einstein Medical Ctr., 547 A.2d
1229, 1234 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1988.)
182. See Nicholson, 722 S.W. 2d., at 750.
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patient must have justifiably relied on the belief.'83
The Superior Court of Pennsylvania decided what determines whether a
physician is an ostensible agent in Boyd v. Albert Einstein Medical Center.'84 In
Boyd, the court held that to determine whether the treating physician is an ostensible
agent of the MCO, the court must consider whether the "patient looks to institution,
rather than individual physician, for care, and whether HMO 'holds out' physician
as its employee." 18
5
Courts are currently split on whether ERISA preempts vicarious liability
claims. 18 6 Federal district courts have been divided on whether ERISA preempts a
claim that an MCO is vicariously liable for the actions of one of its physicians.'87
However, in 1995 the Tenth Circuit of the United States Court of Appeals decided
in an issue of first impression "whether ERISA preempts a claim that an HMO is
vicariously liable for alleged malpractice of one of its physicians." '188 In Pacificare,
the court held that ERISA does not preempt the medical malpractice claim. They
decided that the medical malpractice claim was based on state law, but does not
"relate to" the Pacificare plan sufficiently as to warrant preemption. 9 The court
identified four categories of laws which relate to an employee benefit plan:
First, laws that regulate the type of benefits or terms of ERISA plans. Second,
laws that create reporting, disclosure, funding, or vesting requirements for
ERISA plans. Third, laws that provide rules for the calculation of the amount of
benefits to be paid under ERISA plans. Fourth, laws and common-law rules that
provide remedies for misconduct growing out of the administration of the ERISA
plan.1
90
The court reasoned that the claim that an MCO be vicariously liable for the actions
of its physicians does not involve "the administration of benefits or the level or
183. See id.
184. 547 A.2d 1229 (1998).
185. Id. at 1234.
186. See Noah, supra note 6, at 1244.
187. See Pacificare of Oklahoma v. Burrage, 59 F.3d 151, 153. See also Pomeroy v. Johns Hopkins Medical
Servs., Inc., 868 F. Supp. 110, 113-14 (D.Md. 1994) (holding ERISA preempts medical malpractice claim against
MCO based on vicarious liability); Visconti ex rel. Visconti v. U.S. Health Care, 857 F.Supp. 1097, 1102-05
(E.D.Pa. 1994) (same); Dukes v. U.S. Health Care Sys. of Pa., Inc., 848 F.Supp. 39,42-43 (E.D.Pa. 1994) (same);
Nealy v. U.S. Healthcare HMO, 844 F.Supp 966, 972-73 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) (same); Ricci v. Gooberman, 840
F.Supp. 316, 317 (D.N.J. 1993) (same). But see, Jackson v. Roseman, 878 F.Supp. 820, 826 (D.Md. 1995)
(holding ERISA does not preempt medical malpractice claim against MCO based on a vicarious liability or
ostensible agency theory); Haas v. Group Health Plan, Inc., 875 F.Supp. 544,548 (S.D.fll. 1994) (same); Dearmas
v. Av-Med, Inc., 865 F.Supp. 816,818 (S.D.Fa. 1994) (same); Kearney v. U.S. Healthcare, Inc., 859 F.Supp. 182,
186-88 (E.D.Pa. 1994) (same); Burke v. Smithkline Bio-Science Labs., 858 F.Supp. 1181, 1184 (M.D.Fla. 1994)
(same); Paterno v. Albuerne, 855 F.Supp. 1263,1263-64 (S.D.Fla. 1994) (same); Smith v. HMO Great Lakes, 852
F.Supp. 669,671-72 (N.D.ll. 1994) (same); Elsesserv. HospitalofPhiladelphia College of Osteopathic Medicine,
802F.Supp. 1286,1290 (E.D.Pa. 1992) (same); Independence HMO, Inc. v. Smith, 733 F.Supp. 983,988 (E.D.Pa.
1990) (same).
188. Burrage, 59 F.3d at 153.
189. Id. at 153-54.
190. Id. at 154.
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quality of benefits promised by the plan." ' Instead, the claim alleges negligent
care by the physician and an agency relationship between the MCO and the
physician.' The Pacificare court stated that "just as ERISA does not preempt the
malpractice claim against the doctor, it should not preempt the vicarious liability
claim against the HMO if the HMO has held out the doctor as its agent."'93
3. Enterprise Liability
One way to narrow the scope of ERISA is to establish enterprise liability.9"
This would keep health care costs to a minimum while maximizing quality.195
Enterprise liability identifies who has the most control over the cause of the
negligence and makes this party liable for the injury under theories of
malpractice. 96 Physicians would be treated as part of a "single enterprise" that
would be liable for negligence."9 This is especially appealing to physicians
because they would not have to maintain their own malpractice insurance, and there
would be less of a need for physicians to practice defensive medicine. 8 Enterprise
liability benefits the patient as well, because it is easier to recover for injuries. 199
This is a much more equitable malpractice system. It does not hold physicians
solely responsible for patient injuries when the physician is not solely responsible
for patient treatment decisions.2'0 Enterprise liability encourages cost containment,
but not to the point that patient care deteriorates.20'
4. Utilization Review as a Medical Decision
Historically, prohibitions on the corporate practice of medicine2 2 have given
physicians a monopoly on the practice of medicine. 3 The negative implication of
this is that physicians bear sole responsibility for negligent medical decisions.2
191. Id. at 155.
192. See id.
193. Id.
194. See generally Grosso, supra note 7, at 450.
195. See id.
196. Seeid, at437.
197. See Allred, supra note 129, at B9.
198. See id. See also Frankel, supra note 9, at 1298 (explaining that physicians are paying more than 5 billion
dollars peryear on malpractice insurance). This does not include the hidden costs of practicing defensive medicine.
Defensive medicine is where tests and procedures are done primarily in anticipation of litigation. This is estimated
to cost as much as 15 billion dollars per year). Id.
199. See Allred, supra note 129, at B9.
200. See Grosso, supra note 7, at 450.
201. Seeid. at450.
202. See generally Mars, The Corporate Practice ofMedicine:A CallforAction, 7 HEALTHMATRIX 241 (1997)
(explaining that the basic idea behind the prohibition of the corporate practice of medicine is that the primary
interest ofphysicians is the well being of theirpatients, while the primary interest of corporations is the satisfaction
of their shareholders. Allowing the corporate practice ofmedicine may jeopardize the quality and delivery of health
care. Id.
203. See J. Scott Andreson, Is Utilization Review the Practice of Medicine? Implications for Managed Care
Administrators, 19 J. OFLEGALMEDICINE 431,446 (1998).
204. See id.
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However, the prevalence of MCOs has brought about an erosion of physicians
having sole medical decision making power.20 5 If prospective utilization review can
be classified as a medical decision, it is possible for liability to shift to MCOs in
some cases." 6 The following three cases clearly clarify this issue:
a. Corcoran v. United Health Care 7
In Corcoran, the plaintiff needed to be monitored because of a history of high
risk pregnancy."° The plaintiff's physician felt that hospital monitoring was
necessary, but utilization review did not approve this hospitalization. UR approved
home health nursing. Corcoran could not afford to pay the hospitalization herself,
so she accepted the home care. Within two weeks of the UR decision not to pay for
hospitalization, Corcoran' s fetus went into distress while the home health nurse was
not present. The fetus subsequently died. On appeal, the fifth circuit stated the
central issue is how to characterize the actions of utilization review. 9 The
defendant claimed that they merely applied criteria to determine benefits, while
Corcoran, the plaintiff, maintained that the utilization review decision was a
medical one.21 The court held that the utilization review decisions were medical
decisions.2 ' The court ultimately decided in favor of the defendants, however,
when it concluded that the utilization review decisions were medical ones but were
made in the context of determining benefits under the health plan.212 As a result,
ERISA preempted recovery for Corcoran.2P 3
b. Long v. Great West Life & Annuity Ins. Co.214
In Long, the plaintiff suffered from herniated vertebral discs.215 The condition
caused Long a great deal of pain.216 He visited several physicians who authorized
surgery.1 7 Long' s insurance company utilization review board would not authorize
the surgery, so Long paid a penalty so that he could proceed with the surgery
205. See id.
206. See id.
207. 965 F.2d 1321 (5th Cir. 1992).
208. See id. at 1322-24.
209. See id. at 1329-30.
210. See id. at 1326.
211. See id. at 1331.
212. See id.
213. See id.
214. Long v. Great West Life & Annuity Ins. Co., 957 P.2d 823 (Wyo. 1998).
215. See id. at 826.
216. See id. at 837.
217. See id.
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without the necessary pre-authorization.218 Subsequently, Long sued Great-Life.
219
The Long court held that utilization review was a medical decision, and thus Long
could seek a judicial remedy for the insurance company's conduct.220
c. Murphy v. Board of Medical Examiners of the State of Arizona221
Dr. Murphy is a physician who conducted utilization reviews for Blue
Cross.222 He denied a patient a gallbladder surgery, claiming that it was not
medically necessary.223 However, the patient's surgeon felt the surgery was
medically necessary, so he proceeded to operate on the patient despite the MCO's
refusal to pay for the procedure.2 Pathology on the patient's gallbladder revealed
that the surgery was medically necessary.225 Blue Cross eventually paid for the
surgery, but the patient's surgeon made a complaint to the Board of Medical
Examiners (BOMEX) criticizing Dr. Murphy's decision that the gallbladder surgery
was not medically necessary. 26 Dr. Murphy claimed that the BOMEX had no
jurisdiction over him because he was not practicing medicine.227 The court held that
the utilization review decisions "unequivocally" were medical decisions.22
Moreover, the court stated that the decisions Dr. Murphy made were "appropriate
for the symptoms and diagnosis of the [c]ondition." '229
There are several other results of utilization review being classified as the
practice of medicine that are worth noting. First, all states require a person to be
licensed to practice medicine. If states defined UR as the practice of medicine,
states would require the decision makers in the utilization review process to have
medical licenses 30 In addition, an unlicenced administrator could be subject to
criminal proceedings since it is a criminal offense in all states to practice medicine
without a license."' Even if administrators are licensed to practice medicine, they
could be still be subject to criminal charges if they are not licensed in the state in
which they are performing the utilization review." As noted in Murphy,233 liability
is not limited to criminal actions. 4 The particular state medical board of the state
in which the utilization review is taking place may also be given the authority to
218. See id.
219. See id.
220. Long v. Great West Life & Annuity Ins. Co., 957 P.2d 823, 852 (Vyo. 1998).
221. 949 P.2d 530 (1997).
222. See id. at 532.
223. See id.
224. See id. at 533.
225. See id.
226. See id.
227. See Murphy v. Bd of Med Exam'rs of the State ofAriz, 949 P.2d 530, 533 (1997).
228. Id. at 536.
229. Id.
230. See ANDERSON, supra note 203, at 452.
231. See id.
232. See id.
233. 949 P.2d at 530.
234. See ANDERSON, supra note 203, at 453.
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oversee decisions made by utilization review administrators.235
V. MRIM NG PHYSICIAN LIABIITY
In light of MCOs, Wickline, Wilson, and all the other complex issues involved,
many physicians are unclear on their responsibility as decision makers for their
patient's treatment, especially when it is contradicted by a third party payor." 6 This
section outlines ideas about what physicians owe their patients in the era of
managed care as well as strategies physicians can use to minimize their liability.
A. What Should a Physician's Duty Be?
Most people agree that physicians should take sensible measures to prevent
their patients from being injured by cost-conscious treatment decisions."7 Medicine
has an "egalitarian ethic which imposes on a physician a duty to care for his patient
regardless of the patient's ability to pay.""z The duty of care can never depend on
whether payment will be made. 9 If this situation were allowed to happen, a two-
tiered duty of care would develop.24 One court eloquently explained why the duty
of care should not be tied to cost:
Whether the patient be a pauper or a millionaire, whether he be treated
gratuitously or for reward, the physician owes him precisely the same measure
of duty, and the same degree of skill and care. He may decline to respond to the
call of a patient unable to compensate him; but if he undertake the treatment of
such a patient, he cannot defeat a suit for malpractice, nor mitigate a recovery
against him, upon the principle that the skill and care required of a physician are
proportioned to his expectation of pecuniary recompense.24'
Some courts have even held that failure to perform all available diagnostic
tests constitutes negligence, though others reject this claim of due care in
diagnosis.242 "If financial pressures cause a physician to deviate from the required
standard of care, then the patient's health is threatened. 243 Physicians must ignore
the pressures of MCOs when it comes to making treatment decisions so that the
quality of care is not diminished, for it is the physician who is in the best position
235. See icL
236. See Andrea Jean Lairsen, Reexamining the Physician's Duty of Care In Response to Medicare's
Prospective Payment System, 62 WASH. L REV. 791, 804 (1987).
237. Id. at 792.
238. Kohler, supra note 40, at 1078.
239. See Lairsen, supra note 236, at 805.
240. See id. at 806.
241. Becker v. Janinski, 15 N.Y.S. 675, 677 (NY 1891), noted in Frankel, supra note 9, at 1316.
242. See Frankel, supra note 9, at 1316. See also Forrestal v. Magendantz, 848 F.2d 303, 310 (Ist Cir. 1988);
Clark v. United States, 402 F.2d 950, 952 (4th Cir. 1968); Wilkinson v. Vesey, 295 A.2d 676, 683 (R. 1972);
Smith v. Yohe, 194 A.2d 167, 173 (Pa. 1963) (supporting the claim of due care in diagnosis). But see Durr v.
McElrath, 382 S. E. 2d 20, 22 (S.C. Ct. App. 1989) (rejecting duty to perform all available tests).
243. Lairsen, supra note 236, at 805.
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to care for the patient. The physician is "educated to care for the patient. . ., knows
the patient, has treated the patient, and can assess the patient's needs. Patients
entrust themselves to their physicians ... "244
One related issue is whether a physician has a responsibility to disclose cost
containment measures that impact his or her patient's care. An MCO should
"publicly disclose its cost-benefit standards" so that consumers can make informed
choices on which health care plan to use.2 45 Patients are entitled to make informed
judgments about their treatment.246 The American Medical Association (AMA)
strongly believes that physicians have a "legal and ethical duty to provide patients
with all the information they require... patients should no longer fear that third-
party payors could interfere with crucial medical information."247 This includes
disclosing utilization review policies and procedures?48
Physicians should be aware that some MCOs include gag clauses in their
contracts .2 49 Gag clauses are contractual provisions intended to preclude physicians
from disclosing medically significant information to patients or from revealing to
the patient that the MCO might not be treating him or her fairly.5 0 The AMA insists
that physicians should not tolerate these gag clauses under any circumstancesY 1
The following is an example of a gag clause:
Physician shall agree not to take any action or make any communication which
undermines or could undermine the confidence of enrollees, potential enrollees,
their employers, their unions, or the public in U.S. Healthcare or the quality of
U.S. Healthcare coverage. Physician shall keep the Proprietary Information
payment rates, utilization-review procedures, etc. and this Agreement strictly
confidential 52
This leads to the question of whether a physician should have a duty to
disclose personal interests unrelated to the patient's health that may affect the
physician's medical judgment 5 3 The reason that lack of disclosure leads to
liability is that the patient cannot trust the physician if the patient is unaware of the
physician's hidden economic interest.254 This is difficult to determine in today's
heath care setting because many things are affected by what a physician can afford
to do as well as what the patient can afford." The traditional standard of disclosure
244. Id. at 807.
245. John C. Goodman, A Plan to Empower Patients, WALL ST. J., May 2, 1995, at A18. See also Jennifer A.
Hradil, Patchwork Patient Protection: Must We Choose a Single Pattern?, 27 SErON HALL L. REv. 203, 223
(1996).
246. See Hradil, supra note 245, at 225.
247. Statement of Thomas R. Reardon, M.D., supra note 136.
248. See ia
249. See id.
250. See RICHARDs, supra note 12, at 455.
251. See id.
252. Id., (quotedin Woodhandler&Himmelstein, ExtremeRisk-TheNew Corporate PropositionforPhysicians,
333 Nav ENO. J. MED. 1706, 1706 (1995).
253. See BLACKMON, supra note 124, at 388.
254. See id.
255. See id
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was informing a patient in a manner consistent with how other physicians would
disclose. 6
Two cases clarify what a physician's duty to disclose information should be
in today's health care system. 7 In Canterbury v. Spence,"s a new standard was
expressed which was based on the individual patient's informational needs instead
of what other physicians would disclose. 9 In Moore v. Regents of the University
of California,26 informed consent was expanded to require the disclosure of
conflicts of interest.26 The court stated that the physician must disclose personal
interests unrelated to the patient's health that may affect the physician's medical
judgment whether those personal interests pertain to research or economics.262
These two cases suggest that "a physician would be liable for failing to obtain an
adequate informed consent if the physician failed to explain to a patient that the
physician's financial compensation may be based on incentives to deny or restrict
care.
263
Another important issue in this area is the idea of physicians as fiduciaries.
Almost all states have case law holding that the physician-patient relationship is a
fiduciary one.2" In managed care plans, physicians who are not cost-effective (as
deemed by the MCO) are no longer able to treat MCO patients.2 6' This puts the
physician in a legal quandary.2 66 MCOs also provide incentives to physicians to
limit care. These things can lead to a breach of a physician's fiduciary duty to the
patient." Breach of fiduciary duty is a cause of action on its own and can also
give rise to criminal actions for fraud.26  In the traditional physician-patient
relationship, physicians should be "financially disinterested decision makers,
influenced only by the patient's best interests."
MCOs protected by ERISA create two conflicts between the physician's
fiduciary duty to the patient and the physician's obligation to the MCO.269 First,
physicians as fiduciaries are bound to order medically necessary care.27' An ERISA
plan may exclude coverage for this care.27 Second, physicians may be impelled to
conceal important information about treatment from their patients so that the
256. See id.
257. See id. at 387.
258. See Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
259. See BLACKMON, supra note 124, at 388.
260. 793 P.2d 479 (1990).
261. See BLACKMON, supra note 124, at 387.
262. See Moore, 793 P.2d at 483.
263. BLACKMON, supra note 124, at 387.
264. See RICHARDS, supra note 12, at 451.
265. See id. at 450.
266. See id.
267. See id.
268. See id. See e.g., Moore, 793 P.2d at 483 (holding that a physician has a fiduciary duty to disclose
economic interests unrelated to patient's health that may affect physician's professional judgment). See also
Carpenter v. United States, 484 U.S. 19 (1987) (holding that breach of physician's fiduciary duty can support
criminal actions for fraud).
269. See RICHARDS, supra note 12, at 452.
270. See id.
271. See id.
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patients will not request the treatment. 2
B. What Strategies Can Physicians Use to Minimize Their Liability?
1. First and foremost, physicians must remember that their primary
responsibility is to their patients.273 It is important to recognize that only a patient's
own doctor can evaluate the emotional aspects of a patient's recovery.274 Physicians
have to balance both physical and emotional aspects of a patient when deciding to
release a patient from the hospital. 5 No policy can replace this interaction between
doctor and patient.276
2. Second, physicians should understand that they are in the best position to
help their patients if they understand and follow all of the MCO policies and
procedures. Physicians should know how utilization review works, be familiar with
coverage and eligibility procedures, and know how to expedite review and appeal.277
3. A physician should gather information about the utilization review process
as it applies to each individual patient. It is important t know why the treatment was
denied and what factors were used to make the decision. The utilization reviewer
will not always provide the physician with this information unless the physician
requests it. This information is helpful to the physician when he or she is appealing
the denial.
4. The physician must also gather information about each individual patient,
such as how far each lives from the doctor, hospital, or emergency room.27 A
discrete inquiry also should be made as to whether the patient is below average
intelligence and whether he or she will comply with discharge instructions or will
notice when something that is not a normal part of recovery occurs. The utilization
review staffer making the decision about a patient's treatment will not know this
information, but it is highly relevant to the determination of treatment.
5. Physicians should appeal each and every denial of treatment that is contrary
to what the physician feels is in the best interest of the patient. Remember that the
physician is the patient's advocate. The physician should endeavor to pursue and
exhaust all pathways to acquiring MCO authorization for the necessary
treatment. 9 For an effective appeal, the physician should be armed with "all
pertinent records as well as an adamant, persistent, and well-justified articulation
of the necessity of the denied treatment. 280
6. Throughout the process, physicians should keep their patients informed
272. See id.
273. See Cheryl Gutman, Patients Should Come First In Managed Care Situations, UROLOGYTIMES, Jan. 1998,
at 15.
274. See Ginger Rugai, HMOs Put Wealth Above Our Health With 'Drive-Through' Mastectomies, CHICAGO
TRIBUNE, Dec. 1, 1996, at 8.
275. See id.
276. See id.
277. See Fiona G. McCord, Power Practice - - Trends in Health Care Law; Between a Rock and a Hard Place,
TExAS LAWYER, Aug. 1997, at 33.
278. See Naomi Pfeiffer, HospitalAdmissions or Discharge Up to Doctor, Not Budget, MEDICALECONOMICS
DRUG TOPICS, Jul. 21, 1997, at 48.
279. See McCord, supra note 277, at 33.
280. See Gutman, supra note 273, at 15.
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about what is going on with the process as well as all treatment options so that the
patient can make an educated choice about what to do next.28  If the MCO
ultimately refuses to authorize treatment, the physician should inform the patient
of treatment alternatives so the patient can decide how he or she wants to
proceed.282 The patient may either decide to forego the treatment or undergo the
suggested treatment without the MCO funding it.283 As stated previously in section
Five A., physicians should avoid gag orders whenever possible so that they are free
to discuss all relevant facts with their patients. According to Memphis physician
Thomas E. Wallace, M.D., J.D., "[w]hen doctor and patient are communicating well
and the patient knows the doctor is an advocate, lawsuits are greatly reduced."284
7. If the physician's treatment of choice is denied, he or she should explore
alternatives. For example, if the MCO will only pay for four inpatient days instead
of eight there may be other alternatives, such as home health care or more frequent
follow up office visits. In the Wickline case, Wickline's physician could have
recommended sending her home with a visiting nurse, instead of discharging her
solely to her husband's care.285
8. Regardless of the mode of treatment, the physician should provide patients
with "clear, written instructions outlining the treatment, what is involved, after-
treatment precautions and care and access to follow-up emergency care. 286 For
example, in the Wickline situation, the physician might have given Wickline and her
husband written instructions and told them to be watching for specific symptoms.
In particular, he should have explained how important it was to seek emergency
care if those or other symptoms presented themselves.
9. One of the most vitally important steps a physician can take to protect him
or herself is to document everything. This includes writing down the treatment plan
the physician feels is medically indicated, how he or she has explained the indicated
treatment to the patient, all actions taken to help the patient obtain authorization,
how the physician appealed denials, and if the treatment was denied, how the
physician explained to the patient that the treatment is still indicated. Every
objection the physician has to treatment denials must be meticulously
documented.28 7 It is important to remember that good medical care will not
necessarily save physicians from a lawsuit. 288 There is a great deal of information
that is collected that is never documented. Physicians may take all the necessary
steps or make correct decisions about patient care but they are still at risk for
liability if their actions are not clearly justified by documentation.289 Plaintiff's
281. See McCord, supra note 277, at 33.
282. See id.
283. See id.
284. Pheiffer, supra note 278, at 33.
285. See Kohler, supra note 40, at 1073. Note, however, that managed care organizations are becoming more
reluctant to pay for home health care.
286. Pheiffer, supra note 278, at 33.
287. See Patricia Thomas, Physicians Out on a Liability Limb, MEDICAL WORLD Nmvs, Jun. 12, 1989, at62.
288. See Janet Dyer, Documentation: The Linchpin of any Malpractice Defense MEDicAL EcomNMics, Oct.
1998, at 18.
289. See id.
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lawyers want winnable cases. Perfect records may make them move on to the next
case.
290
10. Physicians should also reconsider their malpractice coverage. A St. Louis
attorney, Morris Stokes, whose specialty is representing physicians and their
insurance company gives the following advice:
If I was a doctor signing up with a group plan, I would want a 'hold harmless'
agreement from the corporation for any liability arising out of my medical
practice, including decisions about cost containment. Then I would want them
to insure that with a very, very solid company with huge limits.291
Remember that the interests of physicians and MCOs are often adverse.2 92
Physicians might consider negotiating with the MCO to provide malpractice
coverage.29 If the MCO agrees to provide the physician with malpractice coverage,
the physician should be the primary insured on the policy.294 This gives the
physician more control over whether the claim is defended or settled, and if the
claim is settled, the terms of the settlement.295 The physician also should hire his
or her own attorney to monitor and make sure the defense attorney is acting in the
physician's best interest instead of in the interest of the MCO.296
11. Finally, an experienced physician writing to new doctors gives this advice,
which is valuable to all practicing physicians:
[Slhould anyone call you a health-care provider and suggest that your patients are
customers in a business, I offer this suggestion: Stand tall, look them in the eye,
and say, "I am a doctor and I take care of patients as well as their diseases.
Therefore, I intend to establish a trusting relationship with my patients. I
understand that medical care costs money and I do not intend to waste a penny,
but I am a doctor and not a businessperson. The service I give to my patients
comes first.297
VI. CONCLUSION
There is no doubt that health care costs are skyrocketing. Expensive new
technology, an aging population, and insurance companies' high overhead costs
have caused health care spending to escalate. Managed care organizations and their
cost containment methods were created to alleviate this difficulty, which in turn,
have caused enormous problems of their own. ERISA's protection of MCOs further
290. See id.
291. Thomas, supra note 12, at 472.
292. See RicHARDs, supra note 12, at 452.
293. See id.
294. See id.
295. See id.
296. See id.
297. J. Willis Hurst, M.D., Thoughts About Becoming an Intern on a Medical Service, RESIDENT AND STAFF
PHYSiCiAN, Aug. 1998, at 73 (emphasis in the original).
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aggravates these problems. Legislation is needed to correct these problems, but
until this comes to pass, physicians and their lawyers must be aware of the issues
involved and utilize strategies that minimize physician liability. Only when the
physician is protected can good patient care be insured.
Lauren Fielder Redman
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